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INSECURITY FOR SECURED
CREDITORS - THE FLOATING LIEN
AND SECTION 547 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
ARTHUR J. HARRINGTON*
Any security that will not stand up in case of insolvency of
the debtor is only a trap for the unwary creditor. Of all the
tests to which a security transaction can be put, bankruptcy
is the most exacting. This is as it should be.1
On October 1, 1979, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
became effective.2 Section 547 of the Act provides the bank-
ruptcy trustee with the power to avoid preferential transfers'
and section 547 contains important changes which should con-
cern the secured party who takes a security interest in after-
acquired property of the debtor.
Since the enactment of the original preferential transfer
provisions in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a constant battle
has been waged in the bankruptcy forum between secured and
unsecured creditors for rights in after-acquired property of
the debtor. Section 547 represents a compromise between
these warring factions. This compromise has evolved through
numerous changes in the preferential transfer provision of the
Bankruptcy Act since the 1898 Act. This article will describe
those changes which led to the compromise embodied in sec-
tion 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and point out
some of the difficulties arising therefrom.
The enactment of section 547 was also the direct result of
certain judicial theories which have evolved since the adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Prior to the enactment of
section 547, these judicial theories virtually insulated a float-
* B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1972; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1975. Mr.
Harrington is an associate in the firm of Charne, Glassner, Tehan, Clancy &
Taitelman, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. MacLachlan, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Secured Transactions, 60 COLUM.
L. RE v. 593, 608 (1960).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. (1979).
3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (1979). Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is
reprinted in the Appendix to this article.
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ing lien creditor from attack under the preferential transfer
section of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 547 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act will have an important effect in the application of
these theories in the future. This article will describe these
judicial theories and evaluate their impact on floating liens
under section 547. Finally, this article will evaluate a new the-
ory which may be available to the floating lien creditor who is
faced with a preferential transfer attack under section 547 by
the bankruptcy trustee.
I. SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFTER-AcQUIRED PROPERTY UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Perhaps no form of collateral has become more important
in modern lending than the category loosely defined as
"quick" assets of a debtor, such as inventory and accounts re-
ceivable.4 These assets are deemed to be "quick" in the sense
that their very nature suggests a rapid turnover in the normal
course of doing business. Sales of inventory items generate ac-
counts receivable for the debtor, and payments on the ac-
counts receivable generate funds for new purchases of inven-
tory.' The success of this business cycle is dependent upon an
unencumbered system for liquidation of these assets.
Prior to 1950, quick assets were not an important source of
collateral for the lending industry since traditional lending in-
struments were too cumbersome when applied to these types
of collateral.0 The business debtor could ill afford to delay a
sale of a product out of inventory to a customer until such
time as his banker could release a collateral security interest
in that product. From the lender's perspective, the adminis-
trative expense of protecting a security interest in each piece
of new inventory and each new account receivable was prohib-
4. "Although section 9-204 speaks of 'after-acquired collateral' generally and
would therefore apply when the collateral is a relatively fixed or long-term asset (such
as plant equipment), the section's greatest impact would appear to be upon financing
transactions in which the collateral is composed of assets classified as 'current' or
'quick' (such as inventory or receivables)." Kronman, The Treatment of Security In-
terests in After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA.
L. REv. 110, 119 (1975) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Kronman].
5. Id. at 119.
6. 1 G. Gu.MORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.7, at 360 (1965)"
[hereinafter cited as 1 G. GmMORE].
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itive, given the recording and filing requirements of state law.7
Traditional modes of financing and collateral instruments
were ill-suited to the lender's need for low administrative
costs and the debtor's need for liquidity of his inventory and
accounts receivable.8
However, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
by the states provided a unique financing device to meet the
needs of lenders and debtors with respect to these quick as-
sets: the "floating security interest."9 The floating lien is nor-
mally characterized by a security interest in all of the debtor's
inventory and accounts receivable. Two other characteristics,
however, make this security interest uniquely tailored to the
needs of the lender and the commercial debtor: (1) automatic
attachment of the security interest to inventory and accounts
receivable acquired and generated by the commercial debtor
in the future; and (2) immediate perfection of the lender's se-
curity interest upon future acquisitions of inventory and gen-
eration of accounts receivable by a previous recordation of the
financing statement.10
These rather novel characteristics of the floating lien are
made possible by provisions contained in Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.11 In particular, section 9-204(1) pro-
vides that all obligations detailed in a security agreement may
be secured by collateral which is acquired by the debtor sub-
sequent to the date of the agreement.1 2 The drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code expressly approved the character-
7. The main disincentive for the use of quick assets as a security device was the
Supreme Court's decision in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). In Benedict, the
Court held fraudulent as a matter of state law transactions where the debtor retained
the right to sell collateral freely without prior approval from the lender.
8. 1 G. GLMORE, supra note 6, § 2.3, at 27.
9. 1 G. GmMoRE, supra note 6, § 11.7, at 359-65.
10. Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 74 Wis. L. RFv. 925, 927 (1974).
11. With the exception of the State of Louisiana, all of the states and the District
of Columbia have adopted the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
State of Wisconsin adopted the 1972 amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code
in 1973. See 1973 Wis. Laws ch. 215. The provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
can be found in Wis. STAT. §§ 401-409 (1977).
12. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) states as follows: "Except as provided in subsection (2), a
security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by the security
agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral."
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istics of immediate attachment and perfection of the floating
lien:
Subsections (1) and (3) read together make clear that a
security interest arising by virtue of an after-acquired prop-
erty clause has equal status with a security interest in collat-
eral in which the debtor has rights at the time value is given
under the security agreement. . . . That is to say: the secur-
ity interest in after-acquired property is not merely an "eq-
uitable" interest; no further action by the secured party -
such as the taking of a supplemental agreement covering the
new collateral - is required.13
As important as the floating lien has become in the com-
mercial lending market, it has been a thorn in the side of the
bankruptcy trustee. Throughout the history of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, battles have been waged between the commercial
lender, secured by future property of the debtor, and the trus-
tee under the preferential transfer provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The very act against which the creditor attempted
to secure himself - the bankruptcy of the debtor - has be-
come a source of insecurity for the creditor and the trustee at
different times.
II. PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS UNDER BANKRUPTCY LAW - A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A primary objective of the Bankruptcy Act is equality of
distribution among creditors of the estate. 14 The preferential
transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Act carry this notion of
equality among creditors to a period prior to the declaration
of bankruptcy. This period has ranged in duration from four
months under previous Acts to ninety days under the current
Act.15
In general, the preferential transfer section of the Act in-
13. See U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 2 (1957 version). Prior to the enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, numerous courts which wrestled with the validity of liens
covering future property not yet owned by the debtor had condemned them as merely
"equitable" interests. A thorough discussion of the historical treatment of liens in
future property is provided in Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause,
87 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1939).
14. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper and Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941).
15. The ninety-day period under the current Act is limited to a "non-insider." If a
creditor qualifies as an "insider," the period is enlarged to one year prior to bank-
ruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4) (1979).
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validates certain transfers of the debtor's property to creditors
for debts incurred at a time prior to the transfer.16 Prior to
the enactment of section 547, there were seven elements of
proof required to invalidate a transaction as a preferential
transfer.17 The most important questions included: (1) Was
the transfer made within the four-month time period? and (2)
Was the transfer made on account of an antecedent debt?
It is apparent that the concept of a floating lien is vulnera-
ble to attack by the trustee as a preferential transfer. Under
the notion of a floating lien, the commercial borrower is agree-
ing to grant a security interest to the lender in the future
property which the borrower may acquire in order to secure
the present debt owing to the lender. When the acquisition of
the future property by the debtor occurs, along with auto-
matic attachment and perfection of the security interest
within the prescribed period prior to bankruptcy,1 8 the trustee
is tempted to make the argument that the transaction repre-
sents an invalid transfer of property for an antecedent debt
within the meaning of the preferential transfer section of the
Act. This temptation was nurtured by certain historical devel-
opments in the law of preferential transfers.
The crucial consideration for determining whether a float-
ing lien qualifies as a preferential transfer is timing. In other
words, the occurrence of the following events determines the
time of transfer: (1) the execution of the security agreement;
(2) the perfection of the security interest; or (3) the acquisi-
tion of the future collateral by the debtor. Prior to the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1921, various amendments to the bank-
ruptcy law had failed to adequately define the appropriate
timing element for security devices which were analogous to
the present-day floating lien.
In the original Act of 1898,19 the preferential transfer pro-
vision merely stated that any preference given within four
months before bankruptcy was voidable by the trustee.20 The
16. 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY 1 60.02, at 758-59 (14th ed. 1977).
17. See note 49 infra.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 544, 562.
20. The original text of § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided as follows:
Sec. 60. Preferred Creditors. - a. A person shall be deemed to have given a
preference if, being insolvent, he has procured or suffered a judgment to be
1980]
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Act did not make any reference to recording requirements of
state laws. The four-month period ran from the time of giving
the preference and not from the time of recording a transfer
in the public records. Thus, a creditor could obtain a "secret
lien" (i.e., an unrecorded agreement for a lien in the debtor's
property), wait four months and then record the security
agreement in accordance with the recording requirements of
state laws on the eve of bankruptcy. This recording gave pri-
ority to the creditor and was not subject to preferential attack
since transfer of the lien, rather than the recording, occurred
more than four months prior to bankruptcy.2 1 In this manner,
entered against himself in favor of any person, or made a transfer to [sic] any
of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer
will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than any other of such creditors of the same class.
b. If a bankrupt shall have given a preference within four months before
the filing of a petition, or after the filing of the petition and before the adjudi-
cation, and the person receiving it, or to be benefited thereby, or his agent
acting therein, shall have had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended
thereby to give a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may
recover the property or its value from such person.
c. If a creditor has been preferred, and afterward in good faith gives the
debtor further credit without security of any kind for property which becomes
a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such new credit remaining unpaid
at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off against the
amount which would otherwise be recoverable from him.
d. If a debtor shall, directly or indirectly, in contemplation of the filing of a
petition by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an attorney and
counselor at law, solicitor in equity or proctor in admiralty for services to be
rendered, the transaction shall be re-examined by the court on petition of the
trustee or any creditor and shall only be held valid to the extent of a reasona-
ble amount to be determined by the court, and the excess may be recovered by
the trustee for the benefit of the estate.
3 W. CoLLmR, BANKRuPTcY 1 60.05, at 771 n.7 (14th ed. 1977).
21. The defect in the 1898 Act was well documented in Carey v. Donohue, 240
U.S. 430, 435 (1916):
In its original form, § 60 made no reference to record. The four months ran
from the time of the giving of the preference, and if this period had elapsed
when the bankruptcy proceeding was instituted, there could be no recovery
under § 60, whether the transfer had, or had not, been recorded. But a differ-
ent rule was established for computing the time within which a petition in
bankruptcy might be filed. In § 3b, it was provided that the four-month period
should not expire "until four months after (1) the date of the recording or
registering of the transfer. . . when the act consists in having made a transfer
. . . for the purpose of giving a preference . . . if by law such recording or
registering is required or permitted, or, if it is not, from the date when the
beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or continuous possession of the property
unless the petitioning creditors have received actual notice of such transfer."
[Vol. 63:447
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the 1898 Bankruptcy Act actually encouraged the use of secret
liens by creditors.2
The 1903 and 1910 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act,"'
and subsequent case law interpreting these amendments,'
proved inadequate to deal with the secret lien problem. 3
From the perspective of the trustee, the inadequacies were es-
pecially glaring in the case of lenders who had exacted a
promise from the debtor to grant a lien in future property"
This distinction between the test of the right to institute bankruptcy proceed-
ings and the test of the right to recover from one who had received a transfer
alleged to be a preference lay in the terms of the act and could not rightly be
ignored. It was urged that the result was to encourage secret preferential trans-
actions; but the wisdom of the prescribed condition of recovery from the pre-
ferred creditor, and the advisability of conforming the provision of § 60 to that
of § 3b was a matter of legislative, not judicial, consideration. To secure this
conformity, an amendment to § 60 was proposed in Congress in the year 1903,
(citations omitted).
See also Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating
Liens, 54 MINN. L. Rlv. 737, 741-42 (1970).
22. 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRupTcY 60.05, at 772 (14th ed. 1977).
23. The 1903 Amendment added the following provision to section 60a: "Where
the preference consists in a transfer, such period of four months shall not expire until
four months after the date of recording or registering of the transfer, if by law such
recording or registering is required." Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 62, 32 Stat. 797
(emphasis added). The 1910 Amendment to section 60b had no effect on the language
in section 60b of the 1903 Amendment. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 294, 36
Stat. 838.
24. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915); Carey v. Donohue, 240
U.S. 430 (1916); Martin v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 245 U.S. 513 (1918).
25. As a result of these three Supreme Court decisions, see note 24 supra, a re-
cording was only "required" where failure to record made the transfer voidable by a
general creditor. If a recording were not "required," then the date of transfer was the
date of the transfer of the lien and not the date of recording. This very restrictive
interpretation of "required" recording had the effect of encouraging the continued
use of secret liens. 3 W. COLLIER, BANKnuPTcY, 60.37[3], at 921-22 (14th ed. 1977).
26. This interest was commonly categorized as an "equitable lien" by the courts:
An equitable lien is neither a ins in re nor a jus ad rem. It is not a property
in the thing itself, nor does it constitute a right of action for the thing, but is
simply a charge upon it, and, as was remarked by Erie, J., in Brunsdon v. Al-
lard, "the words equitable lien are intensely undefined."
A contract whereby a contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to
make some particular property or fund which it describes a security for a debt
or other obligations creates an equitable lien on the property so indicated. A
contract which shows an intention to charge a particular property therein iden-
tified with an obligation creates an equitable lien thereon. And if a party by
agreement creates a charge or claim in the nature of a lien on property of
which he is the owner or in possession, a court of equity will establish and
enforce it, not only against the party who stipulated to give it, but also against
1980]
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under the preferential transfer provisions of the Act. If the
promise had been exacted more than four months prior to
bankruptcy and a recording occurred on the eve of bank-
ruptcy (a legal lien), the lien would relate back to the date of
the enforceable promise and was not voidable under the pref-
erential transfer provision of the Act.2 In some cases, the
same result occurred in lending transactions closely akin to a
floating lien.2
In 1938, Congress passed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act which were designed to accomplish what previous amend-
ments had failed to achieve - the voidability of all secret
liens. However, the result represented overkill from the per-
spective of the secured creditor. The 1938 Amendment estab-
lished the bona fide purchaser test for the purpose of deter-
mining when a transfer was deemed to have occurred under
the preferential transfer provisions of the Act.29 The test fo-
cused the point of inquiry on the time the transaction became
third persons who are either volunteers, or take with notice. (citations
omitted).
In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., 288 F. 334, 348-50 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
262 U.S. 752 (1923).
27. Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90 (1912); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S.
516 (1905); Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S. 91 (1905). But see Goldstein v. Rusch, 54
F.2d 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), modified, 56 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
604 (1932).
28. In a number of cases, the debtor and creditor entered into an agreement under
which the debtor retained some right to sell or dispose of all or part of the property
subject to a lien and to substitute other property in its place. This practice was de-
clared invalid in some instances under the Bankruptcy Act. See Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U.S. 353 (1925) and City Nat'l Bank v. Zorn, 68 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1934). How-
ever, other courts insulated such practices from the trustees' attack as personal trans-
fers. In re Robert Jenkins Corp., 17 F.2d 555 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 753
(1927).
29. The bona fide purchaser test was embodied in the new language contained in
the last sentence of section 60a:
The new test is more comprehensive and accords with the contemplated
purpose of striking down secret liens. We provide that the transfer shall be
deemed to have been made when it becomes so far perfected that neither a
bona fide purchaser nor creditor could thereafter have acquired rights superior
to those of the transferee. As thus drafted, it includes a failure to record and
any other ground which could be asserted by a bona fide purchaser or a credi-
tor of the transferor, as against the transferee. We have also added a provision
which makes the test effective even though the transfer may never have actu-
ally become perfected.
Analysis from H.R. REP. No. 12889,-74th Cong., 2d Sess. 188 (1936).
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known to the public and lost its shroud of secrecy."0
Under this bona fide purchaser test, the equitable lien se-
curity arrangement would likely be voidable. The final lien, if
recorded within four months of bankruptcy, could not relate
back to the date of the "secret agreement" since a bona fide
purchaser's claim to the collateral would be superior to the
secret lien claimant. However, along with the benefits of the
voidability of the secret lien, came the voidability of various
traditional forms of financing which were not in the category
of secret liens. Under the 1938 Amendment, courts struck
down as voidable preferential transfers and assignments of ac-
counts receivable. 1 Courts also raised the issue of voidability
of trust receipt financings2 on the grounds that such tradi-
tional security interests were not perfected against a bona fide
purchaser prior to bankruptcy.
Congress enacted the 1950 Amendment as a result of a
consensus in the lending community that the bona fide pur-
chaser test of the 1938 Act overstepped the goal of voiding the
30. Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating
Liens, 54 MINN. L. REv. 737, 749 (1970).
31. In Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), a
lender had received an assignment of the debtor's accounts receivable in exchange for
a loan. The applicable state law (Pennsylvania) required notification to account re-
ceivable debtors in order to perfect against a bona fide purchaser. Since the bank had
not notified the accounts receivable debtors, the court held that the trustee had a
superior right to the accounts receivable creditor. The assignment was deemed to
have been made immediately prior to the date of bankruptcy for failure to meet the
bona fide purchaser test of the 1938 Amendments to section 60a.
The Klauder decision was followed and expanded to strike down as preferential
account receivable financing even though state law did not require notification to the
account receivable debtors. In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo.
1943).
32. Trust receipts are a lending vehicle which is particularly important at the re-
tail level of consumer goods such as home appliances and automobiles. Under this
vehicle, the retail debtor is permitted to sell the consumer product in the ordinary
course of his business, and the consumer purchaser takes the product free of the se-
curity interest of the lender. By definition, the right of the lender can never be pro-
tected against the "bona fide" purchaser within the meaning of the 1938 Amendment.
The lender's interest in the consumer goods was struck down as voidable preferential
transfers at the trial level. In re Harvey Distrib. Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950).
However, this result was reversed apparently on equitable grounds that full value had
been given to the debtor by the lender at a time distant from the date of bankruptcy.
Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1951). For an
excellent discussion of this issue under the 1938 Amendment to section 60a see 3 W.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.38[1], at 945-46 (14th ed. 1977).
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secret lien under the bankruptcy law." In the 1950 Amend-
ment, the "bona fide purchaser" test for transactions involv-
ing personal property was replaced with the "lien creditor"
test.3 4 For purposes of determining whether a particular trans-
fer qualified as a preferential transfer, the point of inquiry
was the date that perfection occurred so that "no subsequent
lien .. .obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a
simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee. 3
5
The 1950 Amendmens cleared the air of any suggestion
that such traditional forms of security lending transactions as
trust receipts 6 and assignments of accounts receivable3 7 were
voidable preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Act.
Under the lien creditor test of the 1950 Amendments, both
security transactions were normally beyond the reach of the
33. The purposes of the 1950 Amendment were summarized in the legislative his-
tory as follows:
(a) With respect to section 1 of the bill, dealing with section 60a, its pur-
pose is to clarify the provisions of that section of the Bankruptcy Act; elimi-
nate confusions that have been created by reason of certain court decisions
discussed below; and remove the resultant serious doubts that now exist among
banks, factors, and other extenders of credit upon the validity of security taken
in good faith and for present value. The present language of the act tends to
impede and choke the flow of credit, principally to small-business men, and the
object of the bill is to free its channels.
H.R. RaP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1985 (1948).
34. The bona fide purchaser test was retained for transactions involving real prop-
erty under section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act.
35. In place of the last sentence of section 60a of the 1938 Amendment, the 1950
Amendment substituted paragraphs (2) through (8). Paragraph (2) embodied the lien
creditor test and read as follows:
(2) For the purpose of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer of
property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or suf-
fered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple con-
tract could become superior to the rights of the transferee. A transfer of real
property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered when it became so far
perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor could create
rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee. If any transfer
of real property is not so perfected against a bona fide purchase, or if any
transfer of other property is not so perfected against such liens by legal or
equitable proceedings prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding
under this Act, it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before the
filing of the petition.
36. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
37. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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preferential transfer section of the Act.3s However, once again
the drafter's pen, while succeeding in preserving traditional
forms of secured transactions, had called into question the va-
lidity of yet another emerging form of security for the lender
- the floating lien.
III JUDICAL "PREFERENTIAL" TREATMENT OF THE FLOATING
LIEN UNDER THE 1950 AMENDMENTS
A. The Theory of the Floating Lien as a Preference
Under the "'Lien Creditor" Test
A compelling argument has been made by some authorities
that the grant of a security interest in after-acquired property
of the debtor constituted a preferential transfer under section
60a of the Bankruptcy. Act.39 In order to understand the argu-
ment, one must appreciate the interrelationship between Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 1950 Amend-
ment to section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act.
Normally, a security interest is created and enforceable as
between the debtor and lender by virtue of a written agree-
ment known as a security agreement.40 However, other steps
38. Under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, perfection of the lender's interest is
obtained by filing a statement of the transaction within 30 days of the delivery of the
goods. Proper filing creates an interest superior to intervening or subsequent lien
creditors (i.e., the proper filing relates to the date of the delivery of the goods). Thus,
if the 1950 Amendments were controlling at the time the trial court decided In re
Harvey Distrib. Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950), the court would have held the
transactions there under consideration not a voidable preferential transfer.
Likewise, the result in Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S.
434 (1943) would be reversed. Under Pennsylvania law an assignment of accounts
receivable is automatically perfected against a subsequent attachment creditor of the
assignor as soon as made. See 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 60.48, at 1023 (14th ed.
1977). Thus, even though the transaction was not perfected as against bona fide pur-
chasers of the accounts receivable under Pennsylvania law, it was perfected against a
subsequent lien creditor at the time it was made and this was not a voidable prefer-
ence under the 1950 Amendments.
39. Countryman, Code Sectirity Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269, 277
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Countryman]; Gordon, The Security Interest in Inven-
tory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 49 (1962); King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Does it Insulate the Security Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy? 114
U. PA. L. REv. 1117 (1966); Reimer, Bankruptcy - Preference - Conflict Between
Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60(a). of Bankruptcy
Act, 70 CoM. L.J. 63 (1965).
40. In all instances where the lender does not have possession of the collateral, the
security interest must be evidenced by a writing
1980]
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must be taken to insulate the lender's interest in the collateral
from superior claims of third parties such as lien creditors or
trustees in bankruptcy.
The lender must perfect his interest in order to maintain a
claim superior to the trustee, who is accorded the status of a
lien creditor under the 1950 Amendments to section 60a of
the Bankruptcy Act. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code contains a number of straightforward sections relating
to perfection of a security interest in after-acquired property
of the debtor.41 Two events must occur before a security inter-
est is perfected. First, the security interest must "attach"
within the meaning of the Code. Secondly, steps for perfec-
tion, such as filing of a financing statement, must take place. 2
The concept of "attachment" is a novel aspect of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Attachment is deemed to have taken
place upon occurrence of all of the following: (1), there is an
agreement between the parties; (2) the lender gives value to
the debtor; and (3) the debtor acquires rights in the collat-
Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a col-
lecting bank and Section 9-113 on a security interest arising under the Article
on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third par-
ties . . . unless (a) the collateral is in the possession of the third party. . . or
[(b)] the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description
of the collateral ....
U.C.C. § 9-203(1). The written agreement known as a security agreement must also
contain a description of the collateral that reasonably identifies what is described and
must be signed by the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a).
41. The intent of the drafters of Article 9 in creating a valid security interest in
after-acquired property was to reverse the result in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925). In Benedict, the Court applied state law and invalidated financing agreements
which gave the debtor the absolute right to sell existing collateral and replace that
sold collateral with newly acquired collateral without the specific approval of the
lender prior to each sale. The effect of this decision was to impose a cumbersome
system of accounting which required the debtor to make daily payments to the lender
of all proceeds received from the sale of old collateral. Upon receipt of the collateral,
the lender would immediately remit the proceeds to the debtor in order to maintain
the outstanding loan balance. Section 9-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code was
enacted for the express purpose of validating the transactions under scrutiny in Ben-
edict. See U.C.C. § 9-205, Comment 1.
42. These requirements for perfection are embodied in U.C.C. § 9-303(1), which
provides as follows:
A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the
applicable steps required for perfection have been taken. Such steps are speci-
fied in sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305 and 9-306. If such steps are taken before the
security interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches.
[Vol. 63:447
FLOATING LIENS AND BANKRUPTCY
eral.43 Generally, all three prerequisites will be fulfilled at the
same time in a secured transaction involving personal prop-
erty. The exception to this general rule, however, is the secur-
ity interest in after-acquired property and it is this exception
that spawned the attack against floating liens under section
60a of the Bankruptcy Act.
Perfection does not occur until the debtor acquires the
property within the meaning of the attachment requirement
of Article 9.44 In the context of a security interest in after-
acquired property, this normally occurs well after the debtor
has given value, the security agreement has been signed and
steps have been taken for perfection by the secured party.5
Since perfection in after-acquired property normally occurs
after the secured party gives value to the debtor, the secured
party's claim of a security interest in after-acquired property
is open to attack under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
The critical consideration in an analysis of the attributes
of a preferential transfer is determining when the transfer is
deemed to have occurred. Under the Bankruptcy Act as it ex-
isted prior to the 1978 Reform Act, a transfer was defined to
include an acquisition of a security interest in collateral.46
43. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) defines the prerequisites of attachment as follows:
[A] security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties
with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agree-
ment, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a descrip-
tion of the collateral. . . ; and
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
44. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
45. The steps that the secured party is required to take in order to perfect its
security interest depend upon the nature and possession of the collateral. If the col-
lateral qualifies as tangible personal property such as goods and negotiable docu-
ments and the collateral remains in the possession of the secured party, filing is not
required for perfection. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1) and 9-305. However, the general rule
is that a filing with an appropriate filing office is a necessary step for perfection of
collateral which is not in the possession of the secured party such as inventory, equip-
ment and accounts receivable of the debtor.
46. Section 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 defined a "transfer" as follows:
"Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct or
indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest therein
or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an
interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or
without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment,
pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise; . ...
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Under the Uniform Commercial Code, attachment of a secur-
ity interest in after-acquired property does not take place un-
til the debtor acquires rights in the property. Perfection of a
security interest sufficient to defeat rights of third parties in
the collateral cannot occur until the security interest attaches,
which by definition means that the debtor acquires rights in
the property.47 It is only at this point that the secured party's
claim can be perfected to a degree sufficient to defeat the
claim of a lien creditor within the meaning of the 1950
Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act.48 In other words, since
perfection sufficient to defeat a lien creditor occurs at the
time of acquisition of the property by the debtor under the
Code, the transfer is deemed to occur at this time for purpose
of preferential transfer analysis under the 1950 Amendment
of the Bankruptcy Act.
It should be borne in mind, however, that this is only the
first step in the analysis of whether a security interest in af-
ter-acquired property qualifies as a preferential transfer under
the Bankruptcy Act. The trustee must prove six additional el-
ements in order to invalidate the transaction as a preferential
transfer under the Bankruptcy Act.49 All of these elements
must be satisfied as of the date of acquisition of the property
by the debtor.
For purposes of illustrating the theory that the security in-
terest in after-acquired property of the debtor is a preferential
transfer under the lien creditor test, the following facts should
11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976).
47. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 33-38 supra and accompanying text.
49. The trustee must establish all of the following factors under section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act:
(1) The debtor made a transfer of his property. This element is satisfied in
the context of a secured interest in after-acquired property by the definition of
transfer contained in section 1(3) of the Act.
(2) The transfer must be for the benefit of a creditor. There is little doubt
that a transfer of a secured interest in after-acquired property is for the benefit
of the creditor.
(3) The transfer must be on account of an antecedent debt.
(4) The transfer must have been made while the debtor was insolvent.
(5) The transfer must have been made within four months of bankruptcy.
(6) The transfer has the effect of permitting the creditor to receive a larger
percentage of his debt than any other creditor of the same class.
(7) The creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insol-
vent at the time of the transfer.
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be assumed: On January 1, X executed a security agreement
which afforded Y (secured party) a security interest in X's
present equipment and any equipment which is acquired by X
in the future. On the same date, Y extends $100,000 to X. As
of January 1, the value of X's equipment is $100,000 and on
the same date Y files a financing statement in the appropriate
filing offices. As a result of rapid depreciation, X's original
equipment is worth only $50,000 on June 1 of the same year.
However, on June 1, X acquires $50,000 worth of additional
equipment. At the time X acquired the additional $50,000
worth of equipment on June 1, Y knew X was insolvent. On
July 1, of that year, X fied a bankruptcy petition. Y files a
secured claim against all of the equipment X owns as of the
date of bankruptcy.
With respect to Y's claim for a security interest in X's
equipment purchased subsequent to January 1, a strong argu-
ment can be made that it was voidable as a preferential trans-
fer under the lien creditor test of the 1950 Amendment. The
important issue is whether the claim for $50,000 of X's new
equipment arises because of an antecedent debt within the
meaning of section 60a. All of the six other factual elements of
a preferential transfer are built into the example.5 0
The proponents of preferential transfer treatment for a se-
curity interest in after-acquired property of the debtor state
that such a transfer is for an antecedent debt within the
meaning of section 60 of the Act.51 It is clear that the transfer
of property within the meaning of section 60 occurred at the
time X acquired the new equipment on June 1.52 The debt
that X owed to Y came into existence on January 1 - five
months before the "transfer" of the property within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, the proponents argue,
the transfer must have been "on account of an antecedent
debt" within the meaning of section 60a.53
50. See note 49 supra.
51. See note 39 supra.
52. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
53. In this regard, 3 W. CoLLmR, BANKRUPTCY 60.51A, at 1050.15-16 (14th ed.
1977) states as follows:
If a lender extends credit to a debtor and receives a security interest in the
debtor's inventory, on hand and to be acquired, that security interest will at-
tach when each new part of the inventory is acquired. Assuming that some new
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The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code anticipated
the preferential transfer treatment of a secured party's claim
for a security interest in after-acquired property of the debtor.
The Code states that a security interest in such property
"shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as secur-
ity for an antecedent debt." However, the drafters' intent to
protect a secured party's interest in after-acquired property
from the "long arm" of the trustee is of little effect under the
federal scheme provided under the Bankruptcy Act. While the
Act looks to state law in determining when perfection takes
place,55 the question of whether a transfer was antecedent to a
debt is a question of federal law. 8
All of the foregoing adds up to the strong argument made
by commentators that under the 1950 Amendments, the se-
curity interest in after-acquired property of the debtor quali-
fied as a voidable preferential transfer if acquired within four
months of bankruptcy. However, judicial treatment of the se-
cured creditor was much more "preferential" to the secured
party's interests than was suggested by the commentators.
acquisitions occur within four months prior to the filing of a petition initiating
a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, at a time when the debtor is insolvent
and the creditor has reason to believe that the debtor is insolvent, is there a
voidable preference? A transfer has occurred during the four-month period.
Was it for an antecedent debt? On the face of it, it was. The credit was ex-
tended or the loan given when the security agreement was entered into, more
than four months before the filing of the petition. At the time the transfer
occurred, i.e., when the debtor obtained rights in the inventory, there was a
debt already owing to the creditor and the security interest attaching to the
new acquisitions was to secure this indebtedness. Therefore, it is obvious that
the transfer is for an antecedent debt and all of the elements of a voidable
preference are present.
See also note 39 supra.
54. U.C.C. § 9-108.
55. Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to
Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 553 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Hogan]; Countryman, supra note 39, at 276; Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and
9, 14 RUtrGs L. R.v. 518 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy].
56. In McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1945), the Court erased
all doubt whether federal or state law applied to the resolution of this issue: "What
constitutes a transfer and when it is complete within the meaning of § 60a of the
Bankruptcy Act is necessarily a federal question,. . . intended to have uniform ap-
plication throughout the United States." (emphasis added).
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B. Judicial Theories Rescue the Floating Lien
In virtually all of the cases which have dealt with the is-
sue57 under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, the courts have
upheld the secured party's claim of a security interest in prop-
erty acquired by the debtor within four months of bankruptcy
against the claim of preferential transfer. The courts have
used four theories to support the validity of the secured
party's interest in such property: (1) the entity theory;58 (2)
the substitution of collateral theory;59 (3) the "so far per-
fected" theory of section 60a(2); and (4) the Uniform Com-
mercial Code section 9-108 theory.
1. The Entity Theory
The entity theory has been employed to avoid the prefer-
ential treatment of a security interest in after-acquired prop-
erty when the collateral is inventory or accounts receivable.
Under this theory, the debtor's inventory and accounts receiv-
able are viewed as a single entity or a floating mass and not a
combination of individual items each subject to a separate
lien. 0 Under this theory, the floating mass (which includes
present and future items) is the entity to which the secured
party's interest attaches at the time of filing a financing state-
ment. Thus, as long as the financing statement is filed before
the four-month period before bankruptcy, the transfer is not
subject to preferential transfer treatment, although the debtor
57. There are three exceptions to this general statement. In re Gibson Products of
Arizona, 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), the court ruled that a perfected security inter-
est in proceeds which were commingled in the bankrupt's account was presumptively
a preferential transfer. For the same result based upon a different analysis, see Fitz-
patrick v. Philco Finance Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974). See also E. F. Corp. v.
Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974) where the court ruled that a transfer did not
occur at the time of filing of the financing statement but at the time value was given.
Since value was given within the four month period prior to bankruptcy, the court
ruled that the floating lien was a preference within the meaning of section 60.
58. This theory has also been referred to as the "res" or "Mississippi River The-
ory." See DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 n.8 (9th Cir. 1969).
59. This theory has also been denoted as the "sophisticated res" theory. See Coo-
gan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Corpo-
rate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203 (1959).
60. In Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D. Mass. 1967), the court
described the entity theory as follows: "In applying § 60, however, inventory sub-
jected to a security interest should be viewed as a single entity and not as a mere
conglomeration of individual items each subject to a separate lien."
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acquires some of the collateral within four months of
bankruptcy."'
The entity theory has evoked strong criticism from com-
mentators because it conflicts with the Commercial Code re-
quirement that the debtor acquire the collateral before perfec-
tion is complete.2 The theory has also been criticized since its
application may permit that which the preferential transfer
section of the Bankruptcy Act was designed to prevent - an
intentional transfer of property to a favored creditor of the
bankrupt.63 Although this criticism has been strong, the the-
ory has been cited with approval by a number of courts in
support of their decisions to uphold a secured party's claim to
the bankrupt's collateral against attack as a preferential
transfer.6
2. Substitution of Collateral Theory
Unlike the entity theory, the substitution theory accepts
the notion that the date of transfer for purpose of section 60
analysis is the time the debtor acquires the new collateral.
However, the substitution theory validates the transaction by
positing that the secured party gives the debtor "new value"
at the time of the acquisition of the collateral.
65
61. This theory has been employed by at least two courts as the exclusive justifi-
cation for upholding the validity of the secured party's interest in after-acquired col-
lateral of the debtor. In Rosenberg, the court held that for the purpose of determining
the date of the alleged preferential transfer of a security interest in the debtor's in-
ventory, the date of execution of the security agreement is the effective date of trans-
fer rather than the date the debtor acquired rights in the collateral. Although the
debtor had reacquired a portion of the inventory within four months of bankruptcy,
the court ruled that there was no preference since the security agreement was exe-
cuted more than four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 638.
See Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951), which also
applied the entity theory in support of its conclusion that the after-acquired security
interest in collateral acquired by the debtor within four months of bankruptcy was
not void as a preferential transfer.
62. 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1004, 1007 (1967); see also text accompanying notes 41 & 43
supra.
63. Hogan, note 55 supra at 561.
64. Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir. 1969); In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 93 (D. Neb. 1971); In re
World Wide Perfume, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 616 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Owen v. Mc-
Kesson and Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
65. One of the requirements for establishing a preferential transfer is that the
transfer must be on account of an antecedent debt. See note 49 supra. If the debtor is
given new value at the time of the transfer of a security interest to the secured party,
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With respect to quick assets, " the theory assumes that the
debtor is constantly turning over existing collateral (selling in-
ventory and collecting accounts receivable) and using the pro-
ceeds to purchase new collateral. Under the substitution the-
ory, the new value is created by unique characteristics of the
floating lien which permit the debtor to sell quick assets cov-
ered by a security agreement without prior approval of the
lender. A security interest in newly acquired assets is consid-
ered to be taken in exchange for the secured party's release of
his rights in existing assets. In other words, so the theory goes,
the secured party's interest in the new quick assets is substi-
tuted for the interest in the released assets.
The substitution theory has been cited by some courts in
support of their decision to insulate the secured party's inter-
est in after-acquired property from the trustee's attack under
section 60.87 This theory finds its roots in the notion that a
mere substitution of collateral is not a preferential transfer.8
the transfer could not be on account of an antecedent debt and a necessary element
of a preferential transfer is missing. See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
66. See notes 4 & 5 supra and accompanying text.
67. In Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir. 1969) the court cited the substitution theory as well as the entity theory in sup-
port of its decision to validate a secured party's claim in the debtor's accounts receiv-
able acquired within four months of bankruptcy. It should be noted that the court
relied on actual evidence of replacement of old accounts receivable with new ac-
counts. The fact that the creditor did not improve his position during the four
months prior to bankruptcy seemed to be an important ingredient for the application
of the substitution theory in the case:
During the critical period from September 20 when the Bank last extended
value until September 30 when Grain Merchants ceased doing business, the
debtor's withdrawals appear generally to have been in line with the deposits
from new accounts receivable .... Our study of this record shows that at the
end of the four months preceding bankruptcy, there was an excess of collateral
over secured debt, indicating that collateral was regularly transferred in substi-
tution for other collateral without diminishing the bankruptcy assets available
for creditors. Here the newly arising accounts receivable may be considered as
having been taken in exchange for the release of rights in earlier accounts and
for a present consideration. Since the relative positions of the Bank and the
debtor were unaltered by the exchanges, the debtor's other creditors cannot be
considered harmed by the transactions with the Bank.
Id. at 217. The substitution of collateral theory was also applied to validate a secured
party's interest in after-acquired property in In re Portland Newspaper Publishing
Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967), af'd on other grounds; DuBay v. Williams, 417
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
68. Jaquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78 (1903); In re Pusey, Maynes, Breish Co., 122
F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941); In re Fred Stem & Co., 54 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1931); and In re
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3. "So Far Perfected" Theory
The so far perfected theory seems to have gained the most
popularity with jurists who have upheld the validity of secur-
ity interests in after-acquired property against attack as a
preference.0 9 This theory is based upon the so far perfected
language contained in section 60a(2).
As in the entity theory, this theory seeks to validate the
security interest in after-acquired property by defining the
transfer date for purposes of preference analysis as the date
when the necessary steps are taken for perfection (usually
filing of the financing statement). 0 However, unlike the entity
theory, this theory attempts to define "transfer" and "perfec-
tion" under federal rather than state law.7'
The so far perfected theory depends upon the definition of
"transfer" provided in section 60a(2) which incorporates the
words from which the theory derives its name.7 2 "Transfer"
Stewart, 233 F. Supp. 89 (D. Ore. 1964). See also Hogan, note 55 supra at 561-63;
Krause, Kripke & Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Pref-
erences and After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 282 (1967); Note, Af-
ter-Acquired Property Security Interests in Bankruptcy: A Substitution of Collat-
eral Defense of the UCC, 77 YALE L.J. 139 (1967).
69. This theory has been applied in numerous cases involving security interests in
various categories of after-acquired property. Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 928 (9th Cir. 1973) (inventory); In re Wilco Forest Machinery, Inc., 491
F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974) (inventory and equipment); Nunnemaker Transp. Co. v.
United Cal. Bank, 456 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1972) (intangibles); Grain Merchants of Ind.,
Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969) (accounts receivable);
DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969) (accounts receivable); Owen v. Mc-
Kesson and Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972) (inventory); In re
World Wide Perfume, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 616 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (accounts receiv-
able); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coos Fidelity Corp., 266 Ore. 1, 511 P.2d 345 (1973)
(farm products).
70. See note 45 supra.
71. The distinction between the "entity" and "so far perfected" was articulated
by the court in DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1969) wherein it
stated as follows:
Some ingenious theories have been spun to avoid the result to which the trus-
tee's logic leads [entity and substitution of collateral theories]. It is unneces-
sary for us to resort to any of them to reject the trustee's argument. The unar-
ticulated premise is that Congress left to state law the definition of "transfer"
and of "perfection," thereby permitting state law to control the impact of pref-
erences. The premise is flawed. Congress itself defined these concepts leaving
only some details to be brushed in by state law.
72. Section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1976) provides the
following definition of transfer: "[A] transfer ... shall be deemed to have been made
or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
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for the purposes of this section is equated with the act by
which priority over later creditors is achieved. Under the the-
ory, one only looks to state law to determine at what point in
time the secured party took the steps necessary to prevent a
subsequent lien creditor from achieving priority over the se-
cured party's claim in the after-acquired property of the
debtor.7" For purposes of quick assets (inventory and accounts
receivable), state law indicates that those steps are taken
when a financing statement is filed with the appropriate filing
officer."4 Even though the debtor may acquire the collateral
later, the secured party's rights are automatically perfected
upon acquisition and cannot be defeated by a lien creditor at
the time of acquisition.75
The so far perfected theory dictates that "transfer," for
purposes of preferential transfer analysis on a floating lien, oc-
curs at the date of filing since a subsequent lien creditor can-
not attain priority in after-acquired collateral covered by the
security agreement. If the financing statement is fied before
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could
become superior to the rights of the transferee." (emphasis added).
73. One court has described the conflict between state law and federal law on the
issue of preferential transfer analysis for security interest in after-acquired property
as stemming from the differing concepts of "perfection" under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and the Bankruptcy Act:
Perfection under § 60(a)(2) occurs when no subsequent lien creditor can
obtain superior rights to those of another secured party or transferee having
rights in the property. Perfection under the Code is governed by § 9-204 and §
9-303. Even though perfection of the security interest under the Code may not
have been accomplished because the security interest in property had yet to
attach, for bankruptcy purposes § 60(a)(2) will treat the secured interest as
indefeasible where it cannot be defeated by a subsequent lien creditor. . . . In
sum, perfection under state law need not be full perfection, but only perfection
so far as is necessary to meet the test of § 60(a)(2).
Owen v. McKesson and Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327, 1331-32 (N.D. Fla.
1972).
74. A filing of a financing statement is required when the collateral under consid-
eration is inventory and accounts receivable. See U.C.C. § 9-302.
75. This result is dictated by U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) which limits the priority of a
lien creditor to "an unperfected security interest" in the same collateral. However,
once a financing statement is filed, a security interest immediately attaches and is
simultaneously perfected upon the debtor's acquisition of the collateral. See U.C.C. §
9-204(1). Since attachment is immediate, there is simply no intervening time between
the debtor's acquisition of the collateral and perfection of the secured party's rights
in the goods during which the lien creditor's right can attach to the debtor's inven-
tory and accounts receivable. See Owen v. McKesson and Robbins Drug Co., 349 F.
Supp. 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
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the four-month period preceding bankruptcy, a secured
party's floating lien will be safe from a section 60 attack under
the so far perfected theory.76
4. Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-108 Theory
The final theory upholding the floating lien against a sec-
tion 60a attack is based upon section 9-108 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Like the substitution of collateral theory,
the section 9-108 theorist argues that the time of transfer for
the floating lien is the date the debtor acquires rights in the
new collateral. In the event the debtor acquires the rights
within the four-month period prior to bankruptcy, this theory
saves the floating lien from voidability under section 60 of the
Act by relying on the language contained in section 9-108 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
In particular, this theory holds that the transfer was not
for an antecedent debt 7" simply because section 9-108 of the
Code says it is not. 8 Since a necessary element of a preferen-
tial transfer is missing, the floating lien is beyond reproach as
a preferential transfer under section 60 of the Act. 9
A few courts have employed the section 9-108 theory in
support of their conclusion that the floating lien was beyond
76. For decisions which have applied the "so far perfected" theory see note 69
supra.
77. A transfer on account of an antecedent debt is one of the seven elements
which are necessary for preferential treatment under § 60a. See note 49 supra.
78. U.C.C. § 9-108 provides as follows:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a per-
fected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in
whole or in part by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as secur-
ity for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral
either in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase
made pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given.
79. It should be noted that U.C.C. § 9-108 requires that the acquisition of the
collateral be "either in the ordinary course of the debtor's business or as an acquisi-
tion which is made under a contract of purchase entered into within a reasonable
time after the giving of new value," and that the secured party give new value at the
inception of the transaction. However, it is difficult to conceive of an acquisition of a
debtor covered by a floating lien which would not be in the ordinary course of busi-
ness given the all-inclusive security agreements normally employed in the context of a
floating lien. See U.C.C. § 9-108, Comment 1.
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attack under section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act.80 However, a
number of commentators have been critical of this theory be-
cause the theory attempts to impose a resolution, relying on
state law, to an issue which is strictly a federal question - i.e.,
is the transfer on account of an antecedent debt?"1
With few exceptions,"2 the worst fears of the commenta-
tors, that the 1950 Amendments to section 60a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act would invalidate the floating lien as a financing
tool, never came to pass.8 3 The secured creditor was fully pro-
tected under the four theories even though his secured posi-
tion improved in relation to other creditors during the four
months prior to bankruptcy. Thus, the judicial application of
the four theories weighted the scale in favor of secured credi-
tors and left the unsecured creditors urging some modification
of the preferential transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act.8s
IV. SECTION 547 - BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
The enactment of section 54785 of the Bankruptcy Reform
80. In Owen v. McKesson and Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Fla.
1972), the court employed the U.C.C. § 9-108 theory as well as the "so far perfected"
and entity theories to insulate a floating lien in the debtor's inventory from attack
under section 60a of the Act. See also In re White, 283 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
81. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 39, at 276; Hogan, supra note 55; Kennedy,
supra note 55.
82. See note 57 supra.
83. See notes 39-56 supra and accompanying text.
84. The radical change in the respective concerns of the secured and unsecured
creditors regarding the preferential treatment of floating liens under the 1950
Amendments to section 60a were outlined in the Report of the Committee on Coordi-
nation of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code (1970) as follows:
What may be called the politics of the project of revising § 60 have thus
come full circle during the past few years. What started out as a rescue mission
for secured creditors may end up as a rescue mission for unsecured creditors. It
is too early to tell whether spokesmen for unsecured creditors' groups will now
support a project which, a few years back, they could have been expected to
oppose. No doubt the discussion of this Report in the Conference will throw
considerable light on what the answer to the question just posed is to be.
The Committee feels that, despite the political reversal, there is still merit
in the proposed legislative solution to the security interest problem. The Ninth
Circuit's analysis of the problem in DuBay weights the scales much too heavily
on the secured creditor's side ....
H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 5963, 6168 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595].
85. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (1979).
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Act of 1978 wrought important changes in the preferential
transfer law as it existed since the 1950 Amendments to sec-
tion 60 of the Act . 6 The extent of these changes has been dis-
cussed by a number of commentators. 7 The most important
change from the perspective of the holder of a floating lien is
the "perfection of transfer" doctrine embodied in subsection
547(e).
Subsection 547(e) contains the "timing" provisions con-
cerning when a transfer is deemed to have occurred for pur-
poses of preferential transfer analysis."" For purposes of a se-
curity interest in after-acquired property of a debtor, a
transfer is deemed to occur at the time perfection has oc-
curred which is sufficient to defeat a lien creditor: "A transfer
of. . .a property other than real property is perfected when a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien
that is superior to the interest of the transferee."8 9
86. Among the more significant changes are the following:
(1) The preference period has been decreased from four months to 90 days for the
creditor who is not an "insider" as defined in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4) (1979). 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(25) (1979).
(2) The debtor is presumed to be insolvent during the 90 days immediately preceding
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(f) (1979).
(3) The requirement of proof that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the
debtor was insolvent has been eliminated for the 90 days immediately preceding
bankruptcy. However, the requirement is maintained for the period between 90 days
and one year before the date of the filing where the creditor is an "insider." 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1979).
(4) It is possible to declare transfers to "insiders" as preferential even though the
transaction occurred between one year and 90 days prior to bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. §
547(b)(4)(B) (1979). An insider is defined to include, but not be limited to, a relative,
partner, director, officer or affiliate of the debtor. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(25) (1979).
(5) New exemptions are provided for the following transactions which would other-
wise be preferential transfers under the Act: (a) "cash sales" involving a very short
extension of credit 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(1) (1979), (b) payment of debts incurred in
the ordinary course of business 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (1979), and (c) a purchase
money security interest in property later acquired by the debtor 11 U.S.C.A. §
547(c)(3) (1979).
87. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-For-Law-
yers Bill, 79 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1979); Rome, The New Bankruptcy Act and the Com-
mercial Lender, 96 BANKING L.J. 389 (1979); Snider, Introduction to the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 52 Wis. B. BULL. 8 (1979).
88. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
89. The test is embodied in the following relevant provisions of subsection (e), 11
U.S.C.A. § 547 (1979):
(e)(1) For the purpose of this section -
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is
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At first glance, the perfection of transfer doctrine embod-
ied in subsection 547(e) seems identical in all important re-
spects to the lien creditor test in the 1950 Amendments to
section 60 of the Act.90 However, subsection 547(e) contains
an additional limitation on the timing determination of a
transfer which was not expressly stated in the lien creditor
test of the 1950 Amendment. Under this additional limitation,
a transfer cannot be deemed to have occurred for purposes of
preferential transfer analysis until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transeferred: "For the purposes of this
section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transferred."91
The limiting language in effect adopts the terminology of
the Uniform Commercial Code and makes the term "transfer"
virtually synonymous with the term "perfection" as under-
stood under the Uniform Commercial Code. 2 For purposes of
determining if a "transfer" of the debtor's property under a
floating lien arrangement is for an antecedent debt and ac-
quired within the ninety-day period prior to bankruptcy, the
focal point for inquiry is when the debtor acquired the
collateral.9 3
This limiting language contained in the perfection of
transfer test of section 547(e) could have startling effects on
the voidability of the floating lien on collateral acquired by
the debtor within the ninety-day period prior to bankruptcy.
The voidability effect on such transactions under section 547
perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial
lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of
this subsection, a transfer is made -
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and
the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after,
such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is per-
fected after such 10 days ....
90. See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
91. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3).
92. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text. Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, four requirements are necessary for perfection: there must be a security
agreement; value must be given; a financial statement must be filed (if necessary);
and the debtor must acquire rights in the collateral. U.C.C. §§ 9-204 and 9-302.
93. This assumes that the secured party who retains the floating lien required
that the debtor execute a security agreement, give value and file a financing state-
ment if filing is necessary for perfection. See U.C.C. § 9-302.
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can best be demonstrated by a re-examination of the example
provided in section III A. of this article. In that example, sec-
tion 547 would lead one to the conclusion that Y's claim of a
security interest in X's equipment acquired on June 1, would
be defeated by the trustee as a preferential transfer. The
perfection of transfer test would dictate that the transfer oc-
curred at the time X acquired the equipment. Since the trans-
fer occurred within ninety days prior to bankruptcy and the
debt was incurred five months prior to the transfer, section
547 would likely condemn the transfer as preferential.
The perfection of transfer test under section 547 calls into
question the validity of a floating lien on all collateral ac-
quired by the debtor during the ninety-day period prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. 4 However, there are certain
safe harbor provisions in section 547 which will serve to vali-
date the traditional floating lien in quick assets for those who
meet certain qualifying conditions.
The safe harbor provision is contained in subsection 547(c)
(5). This provision is limited to a floating lien in inventory95
and accounts receivable98 of the debtor or the proceeds of ei-
ther. The qualifying condition is contained in the improve-
ment of position formula embodied in this subsection. In
94. This statement is based upon the following assumptions:
(1) The security agreement creating the floating lien was executed prior to
the acquisition of the collateral;
(2) Value was given at the time of the execution of the security lien; and,
(3) The secured party does not qualify as an "insider" within the meaning of
the Act. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(30) (1979). In the event the secured party quali-
fies as an insider, the 90-day period is extended to one year prior to bank-
ruptcy if the trustee can establish that the secured party had reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4) (1979).
95. The term "inventory" is defined as follows in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(1) (1979):
"[I]nventory" means personal property leased or furnished, held for sale or
lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in
process, or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products
such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease ....
96. The term "receivable" is defined to include accounts receivable: "'Receivable'
means right to payment, whether or not such right has been earned by performance;
." 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(3) (1979).
97. The "improvement of position" test embodied in subsection 547(c)(5) was de-
rived from the "net result" rule. The net result rule originated in In re Pusey,
Maynes, Breish Co., 122 F.2d 606 (3rd Cir. 1941). In Pusey, the court held that a
transfer of accounts receivable to the secured creditor made during the four months
prior to bankruptcy was not preferential where the accounts transferred were substi-
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general, the improvement test states that a floating lien in in-
ventory or receivables which would be avoided under section
547(b) is spared such treatment if the secured party does not
improve its position in relation to unsecured creditors on the
date of filing for bankruptcy (t2) compared to its relative posi-
tion ninety days before filing (t).0 Improvement is measured
by the relative reduction in the spread between the amount of
outstanding debt and the value of all collateral subject to a
security interest for such debt at t, and t2.as If there is no im-
provement for the floating lien creditor, the safe harbor provi-
sion protects the secured creditor from preferential transfer
treatment under section 547,100
tutes for prior release accounts. The value of the transferred accounts was approxi-
mately the same as the value of the released accounts. Since there was no net increase
in the value of the secured party's interest in collateral, the court was persuaded that
the transaction should not be treated as a preferential transfer. See also Grain
Merchants of Ind., Inc. ,v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 1969)
and First Nat'l Bank of Clinton v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1967).
98. There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, in the event the secured
party is an insider (see note 86 supra) the position of the secured party at the date of
bankruptcy is compared with his position one year before the date of bankruptcy. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) (1979).
Secondly, if new value was given by the secured party within 90 days (one year if
the secured party is an "insider") of the date of filing the bankruptcy petition, the
date new value was given shall be used for comparison purposes rather than the date
which represents 90 days before the filing of the petition. See 11 U.S.C.A. §
547(c)(5)(B) (1979).
99. The safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (1979) does not provide
any guidance for the method to be used for determining the value of the collateral. It
would seem logical to assume that a liquidated value should be assessed for collateral
involving cases filed under Chapter 7 of the Act (11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 to 766). A going
concern method should be used to determine value of the collateral in cases filed
under Chapters 9 (11 U.S.C.A. §§ 901 to 946), 11 (11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101 to 1174) and 13
(11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 to 1330). See 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRuPTcy T 547.41, at 547-123
(15th ed. 1979). With respect to the question of valuation, H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 84, at 6176 states as follows:
The comparison of values at the two measuring points which the Draft re-
quires poses problems of obvious difficulty. A statutory valuation formula
would have been helpful. The Committee has considered a number of sug-
gested formulas but has been unable to come up with a satisfactory one. The
valuation problem is, therefore, left to the referees and judges.
100. Various combinations of factors respecting value of collateral and debt could
result in no improvement within the meaning of the formula. The value of the
debtor's collateral subject to the floating lien could increase from t i to t2. However,
no improvement in the spread would result if the creditor had extended new value to
the debtor in an amount equal to the increase in value of the collateral. It is impor-
tant to note that the relative spread between t i and t 2 is the critical determinant of
the improvement test under § 547. Fluctuations in the spread between t1 and t2 are
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If there is improvement for the floating lien creditor within
the meaning of the formula, the creditor can attain the pro-
tection of the safe harbor provision for the improvement if he
can establish that such improvement was not "to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims."' 01 Al-
though the Act does not define the meaning of this phrase, it
is reasonable to assume that lack of prejudice could be estab-
lished if such improvement simply reflects a seasonal increase
in value of the collateral.10 2
In addition, it could be argued that there was no prejudice
to other creditors if the creditor could establish that the
debtor was not insolvent at the time of the acquisition of the
collateral. The creditor would have to establish evidence suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption of insolvency during the
ninety-day period prior to bankruptcy. In the event the float-
ing lien creditor fails to establish no prejudice to the un-
secured creditors, the amount of the improvement in the cred-
itor's position is void as a preferential transfer. 03
not relevant to the improvement test under the safe harbor provision.
101. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (1979) provides in part as follows:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer -
(5) of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the pro-
ceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to
the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition
and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any
amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value
of all security interest for such debt on the later of-
(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this
section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this
section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest; or
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section
545 of this title.
102. If the improvement in position is the result of increase in value due to mar-
ket or seasonal price fluctuations, which fluctuations are not at the expense of the
estate, such improvement is protected by the safe harbor provisions. The following
example is provided in 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 547.41, at 547-123 to 547-124
(15th ed. 1979).
If, for example, the debtor warehoused its inventory of completed Christ-
mas cards in September and filed a petition in December, any increase in the
value of the inventory is seasonal and not "to the prejudice" of unsecured cred-
itors except perhaps with respect to the cost of warehousing the collateral.
103. See Skilton, supra note 10, at 1005, n.161.
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At first glance, the perfection of transfer test embodied in
section 547(e) would seem to sound the death knell for the
creditor's security interest in after-acquired property of the
debtor when the property is acquired by the debtor within
ninety days before bankruptcy."" However, as demonstrated
earlier, the section contains a legislative safe harbor provision
which protects the floating lien covering after-acquired inven-
tory and accounts receivable of the debtor from preferential
treatment by the trustee.10 5 However, a question remains con-
cerning the validity of the creditor's claim of a security inter-
est in other categories of after-acquired property of the debtor
under section 547. Will the four theories developed during the
reign of the 1950 amendments to section 60 continue to pro-
vide judicially sanctioned safe harbors for such secured credi-
tors under section 547?
V. THE JuDxLcL THEORIEs REvISITED
A. The Entity Theory
The entity theory will not provide a safe harbor for the
floating lien creditor if no protection is afforded the creditor
under section 547 of the Act.oe If the collateral in question is
not a quick asset 07 the entity theory is not appropriate for
consideration. The entity theory was particularly approp-
priate when the collateral involved was composed of numerous
units which were designed to turn over rapidly.'08 Given its
doctrinal underpinning the entity theory would be of little use
to save a creditor with a security interest in after-acquired
equipment of the debtor from the trustee's attack under sec-
tion 547.
104. The presumption of insolvency during this 90-day period is embodied in 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(f) (1979).
105. The following example is provided in H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 84, at
6177.
Let it be assumed that a secured party's collateral four months before
bankruptcy consists of raw materials have [sic] been converted into finished
products worth $20,000. (Under Code § 9-315 the security interest in the raw
materials carries through to the finished product.) Assuming an initial "defi-
ciency" (the debt secured, let us assume, was at all times $25,000), the $10,000
increase in value is not protected... and goes to the trustee.
106. See notes 85-97 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 4 supra and accompanying text
108. See Kronman, supra note 4, at 125, n.56.
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Regardless of the nature of the collateral, the perfection of
transfer test in section 547(e) simply precludes a creditor from
arguing that the transfer occurred at the time the security
agreement was signed as called for by the entity theory. The
perfection of transfer test provides that a transfer cannot take
place until such time as the debtor "acquires rights" in the
collateral. 109 If the collateral is accounts receivable, the time
of acquisition presumably is the date the accounts come into
existence.110
B. The Substitution of Collateral Theory
The substitution of collateral theory applies to collateral
which is replaced with new collateral by the debtor within
ninety days of bankruptcy.""" Its rationale is that the secured
party agrees to the debtor's liquidation of the existing collat-
eral in return for a security interest in the new collateral. 112
The debtor's free use of the proceeds of the liquidation is
viewed as new consideration for the security interest in the
new collateral.113
Under the substitution theory the date of transfer is the
date the debtor acquires rights in the new property. It is con-
sistent with the perfection of transfer test in section 547(e).
109. See notes 97-103 supra and accompanying text. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3)
(1979) provides as follows: "For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made
until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred."
110. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (1979) does not define the concept of acquisition of rights
as used in subsection 547(e). The drafters intended to incorporate the terminology of
the Uniform Commercial Code in the preferential transfer provision. H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 84, at 6328 reads as follows: "[547(e)] is a substantial modification of
present law. It modernizes the preference provisions and brings them more into con-
formity with commercial practice and the Uniform Commercial Code."
U.C.C. § 9-204(2)(d) (1957 version) states that a debtor acquires rights in accounts
at the time they came into existence: "For purposes of this section the debtor has no
rights ... (d) in an account until it comes into existence."
The definition of inventory provided in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(1) (1979) is broader
than that under the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 9-109(4). Under 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(1), inventory is defined to include the following: "'inventory'
means personal property ... to be furnished under a contract for service ...."
In the event the inventory in question resulted from a contract for service, the
creditor could argue that the debtor acquired rights in this inventory at the time the
contract for service arose rather than the date the goods came into existence as a
result of the debtor's service.
111. See note 65 supra.
112. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
113. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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However, under the foregoing analysis, the creditor could ar-
gue the transfer was not "for or on account of an antecedent
debt" within the meaning of section 547.114 A new debt is cre-
ated by the creditor's agreement to release prior collateral in
exchange for a security interest in the new collateral acquired
by the debtor.1 5 The secured creditor would argue that the
full value of the new after-acquired collateral would not be
voidable or a preferential transfer under section 547.116
There are at least three problems with the application of
this theory in the context of section 547. First, the application
of the theory assumes a continual substitution of old collateral
for new collateral. As a practical matter, the applicability of
the theory would be limited to quick assets such as inventory
and accounts receivable. 117 The creditor would be requested to
provide proof that in fact old collateral was being replaced by
new collateral in a reasonably contemporaneo,.;4 fashion.
Secondly, previous application of the theo:-,; by the courts
would suggest that the theory is subject to a i ut result test.11"
In other words, the creditor would likely be required to estab-
lish that the value of the new collateral acquired by the
debtor did not exceed the value of the old "released" collat-
eral. Such a request is strikingly similar to the improvement
test contained in the safe harbor provision of section 547(c)(5)
for inventory and accounts receivable. 119
114. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(2) (1979).
115. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
116. It is interesting to note that the definition of "new value" provided in 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(2) (1979) includes a release of a security interest in property.
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, services, or new
credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such
transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or
the trustee under any applicable law, but does not include an obligation'substi-
tuted for an existing obligation; .... (emphasis added).
117. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. Of course, if the facts demon-
strated that the new collateral was substituted for old collateral, the theory could be
applicable. For example, if equipment were involved, the theory could be applied if
the old equipment was sold by the debtor (or traded in) and replaced by new
equipment.
118. See note 67 supra.
119. The net result test embodied in the substitution of collateral theory may be
more stringent than the improvement test in 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (1979). The lat-
ter test merely charts the relative position of the creditor at two points in time (90
days before bankruptcy and the date of bankruptcy). The former test would monitor
the increase in value of the security over the 90-day period. It is conceivable that
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Finally, the very fact that section 547 contains a safe har-
bor provision applicable to the floating lien is persuasive evi-
dence that Congress intended this provision to be exclusively
applicable for preferential analysis. To the extent that the
substitution of collateral theory would protect an improve-
ment of the creditor's security position during the ninety-day
period, the theory would produce a result diametrically op-
posed to the improvement of position test in section 547.120
C. "So Far Perfected" Theory
There is little question that the perfection of transfer test
in section 547 sounds the demise of the so far perfected theory
as a means for validating a transfer which would otherwise be
voidable as a preferential transfer. The so far perfected theory
provided life to floating liens under former section 60 by de-
fining the transfer date as that date when the creditor took all
steps necessary for perfection.121 This theory held that all
steps necessary to defeat the lien creditor were taken at the
time the financing statement covering after-acquired property
was filed by the secured party.122
there would be no improvement of the secured party's position for purposes of 11
U.S.C.A. § 547 (1979), yet the total value of new collateral had actually increased over
the 90-day period.
120. Indeed, the legislative history provides some strong evidence of the drafters'
intent to not protect any improvement in position for a floating lien creditor during
the 90-day period prior to bankruptcy.
Paragraph (5) [11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (1979)] codifies the improvement in
position test, and thereby overrules such cases as DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1969), and Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank and
Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969). A creditor with a security interest in a
floating mass, such as inventory or accounts receivable, is subject to preference
attack to the extent he improves his position during the 90-day period before
bankruptcy.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 84, at 6330.
121. See, e.g. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1969).
122. The intent of the drafters to overrule the "so far perfected" theory as em-
bodied in DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969) is apparent in the Report
of the Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code:
The Draft definition of "perfection" seeks to negative the DuBay reading of
present § 60a(2) by making use of the Article 9 distinction referred to. Under
the Draft definition a transfer is perfected "when the transferee has acquired
an interest in the property which is superior [to the subsequent interests speci-
fied in the two branches of the definition.]" Thus there is no perfection until
an "interest in the property" has been transferred, which means, to use the
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However, the perfection of transfer test under section
547(e) destroys the fiction embodied in the so far perfected
theory that a transfer of a security interest in a debtor's col-
lateral can occur before the debtor acquires the property.12
The perfection of transfer test mandates that a transfer can-
not occur until the debtor has acquired rights in the collat-
eral.124 In the context of a floating lien, the so far perfected
theory could not be utilized to argue that the time of transfer
for purpose of preferential analysis is the date of filing of the
financing statement.
25
D. Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-108 Theory
Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code attempts
to validate a floating lien by eliminating a necessary element
of a preferential transfer: antecedency of the debt. 28 An ante-
cedent debt is a necessary element of preferential transfer
analysis under section 547.127
The same criticisms leveled at the application of section 9-
108 under section 60 are applicable in the context of section
547.128 However, it is interesting to note that section 547 does
Article 9 terminology, until the debtor (transferor) has acquired "rights in the
collateral." The fact that, under the Article 9 scheme, the prior filing protects
the secured party against subsequent liens (which seemed conclusive to the
Ninth Circuit under present § 60a(2)) becomes relevant.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 84, at 6178.
123. Under both theories, the determining factor for the date of transfer is perfec-
tion. The "so far perfected" theory is fictional since it ignores the mandate of the
Uniform Commercial Code that perfection requires that the security interest be at-
tached. See U.C.C. § 9-303. Under the Code, attachment cannot occur until, among
other things, the debtor has acquired rights in the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-203.
124. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3) (1979) provides as follows: "For the purpose of this
section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property
transferred."
125. See note 122 supra.
126. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
127. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(2) (1979).
128. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. The § 9-108 theory essentially
defines away the problem of voidability under preferential transfer analysis by simply
stating that a security interest in after-acquired property is not for an antecedent
debt. The drafters of the Code could just as easily have chosen to eliminate any other
necessary element under preferential transfer analysis as a means to validate a float-
ing lien. For example, the drafters could have stated, as a matter of state law, that a
transfer of a security interest in collateral was not "for the benefit of a creditor"
within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(1) (1979). The fact that there is not a
greater justification for the approach taken by § 9-108 than by this example serves to
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not attempt to expressly preempt the application of section 9-
108. Indeed, the avowed legislative purpose of section 547 was
to bring preferential transfer analysis into harmony with the
terminology of the Uniform Commercial Code.129 The legisla-
tive history of the Act suggests that the validity of the appli-
cation of section 9-108 in the context of preferential transfer
analysis is left for judicial determination.1 30
The section 9-108 theorist could take heart in the avowed
legislative purpose of section 547. One could argue that the
only way to harmonize section 547 with section 9-108 is to de-
cide that all security interests in after-acquired property of
the debtor acquired in the ordinary course of the debtor's bus-
iness shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not for an
antecedent debt. Of course such a result would not serve to
harmonize the safe harbor provision in section 547(c)(5) with
section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The safe har-
bor provision would be unnecessary if Congress intended that
section 9-108 would control the issue of the validity of a secur-
ity interest in after-acquired property under section 547. The
very fact that Congress created the safe harbor provision for
the floating lien would appear to be strong evidence that Con-
demonstrate the main objection to the § 9-108 theory: it is".. . a clumsy attempt to
perpetrate a fraud on the Bankruptcy Act." See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 84, at
6107.
129. Other problems exist in the current preference section [11 U.S.C. § 109].
They were amply detailed by Prof. Grant Gilmore in his study for the National
Bankruptcy Conference of the interaction of section 60 with the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. In short, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code radi-
cally altered the terminology of secured transactions, and the courts have ap-
plied the new terminology to the preference sections, which uses [sic] certain of
the same words as the Uniform Commercial Code but in different senses and
with different meanings. It is time to bring the two statutes into harmony, and
H.R. 8200 does that by adopting the more modern terminology of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and providing for specific treatment of transfers governed
by the Code. (citations omitted).
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 84, at 6139-40.
130. The Report of the Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code provides as follows:
In this connection it may be noted that the Draft neither expressly adopts nor
expressly rejects the rule of Code § 9-108 under which certain types of after-
acquired property interests (principally interests in property acquired "in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business") are, as a matter of state law, given
"new value" status. The question whether that provision of § 9-108 is valid in
federal bankruptcy proceedings is left for judicial determination.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 84, at 6177.
[Vol. 63:447
FLOATING LIENS AND BANKRUPTCY
gress did not intend the section 9-108 theory to prevail in
preferential transfer analysis.
In the event the floating lien creditor cannot take advan-
tage of the safe harbor provision of section 547(c)(5), it is ap-
parent that the foregoing judicial theories do not provide any
degree of "security" against a preferential transfer attack.
However, the floating lien creditor may utilize the perfection
of transfer test in section 547(e) to remove the transaction
from the ninety-day period prior to bankruptcy.
VI. THE CONCEPT OF DEBTOR'S RIGHTS IN THE COLLATERAL
As mentioned previously, the "perfection of transfer" test
in section 547(e) differs from the "lien creditor" test in the
1950 amendments to section 60 by the express recognition
that a transfer cannot take place until the debtor acquires
rights in the property transferred. In other words, in the con-
text of a floating lien, the required elements of preferential
transfer are examined as of the date the debtor acquires rights
in the collateral and not earlier. 13 1
One of the most critical elements for purposes of the float-
ing lien creditor is whether the transfer of the security inter-
est in after-acquired property of the debtor occurred within
the ninety-day period prior to bankruptcy.1 3 2 In the event the
floating lien creditor can establish that the transfer occurred
more than ninety days prior to the date of bankruptcy, the
creditor can successfully defeat the trustee's attack under sec-
tion 547.133 The floating lien creditor's salvation may be born
in the concept of "acquisition of rights in the collateral of the
debtor" as provided in section 547(e)(3).
131. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
132. Some of the requisite elements under 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (1979) can be
paraphrased as follows:
(1) the transfer was made on account of an antecedent debt;
(2) the transfer was made when the debtor was solvent;
(3) the transfer was made within 90 days before the date of bankruptcy for
the non-insider creditor and one year for the insider creditor; and
(4) the transfer enables the creditor to receive more than he should at the
date of bankruptcy.
133. Of course, if the creditor were to qualify as an "insider" (see 11 U.S.C.A. §
101(25) (1979)), the period would be enlarged to one year. In this event, the trustee
would also be required to prove that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that
the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B)
(1979).
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It is unmistakeable that Congress relied on the concept of
"attachment" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial
Code when it chose to define the date of transfer in terms of
the date when the debtor acquires rights in the collateral. The
floating lien creditor could validate what would otherwise be a
preferential transfer of a security interest if he could establish
that the debtor acquired rights in the collateral prior to the
ninety-day period.'
The requirement for attachment - that the debtor ac-
quire rights in the collateral - is embodied in section 9-203 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.'3 5 The Code does not clearly
establish the meaning of the phrase "rights in the collat-
eral.""' It would appear that rights in the collateral should at
least include the remedies a buyer would have under Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 3 7 In addition, other provi-
sions of Article 2 of the Uniform Code should furnish guide-
lines for determining the time a debtor (buyer) has acquired
rights in the collateral. 38
For example, a floating lien creditor could argue that the
debtor acquires rights in the collateral"3 " as early as the date
134. The trustee must establish the presence of all the five elements described in
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (1979) in order to establish a preferential transfer. The trustee's
failure to establish any one element will prove fatal to any attempt to characterize a
transfer as preferential within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (1979).
135. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
136. It is not surprising that this precise issue has not been litigated in the con-
text of preferential transfer analysis prior to the enactment of section 547. Under the
entity and "so far perfected" theories, the courts were virtually unanimous in their
opinions that the date of transfer for purpose of preferential analysis was the date of
filing of the financing statement rather than the date the debtor acquired rights in
the collateral. See notes 57-84 supra and accompanying text.
137. "Rights" are specifically defined in the Code to include remedies. See U.C.C.
§ 1-201(36). In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 327 (D. Me. 1968) and Avco Delta
Corp. Canada Ltd. v. United States, 459 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1972).
138. Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen of Saybrook, Inc., 25 Conn. Sup. 327, 203
A.2d 441 (1964) and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Washington Trust Co. of
Westerly, - RI. -, 386 A.2d 1096 (1978).
139. The concept of "rights in the collateral" is considered in U.C.C. § 9-203(1)
which provides as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a
collecting bank and Section 9-113 on a security interest arising under the Arti-
cle on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third
parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agree-
ment, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a descrip-
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the collateral was identified by the seller.140 If a contract is
made for the sale of goods already existing, the date the con-
tract is made is the date of identification.14 1 Thus, the floating
lien creditor could argue that the transfer of the security in-
terest for preferential transfer analysis occurred at the date
the collateral was contracted to be bought by the debtor. The
concept of rights in collateral is not limited to collateral
owned by the debtor.1 42 In addition, the floating lien creditor
could argue that the date of transfer of the security interest
occurred as of the date the title to goods passed to the debtor
from the seller.'44 Title can pass as early as the date of identi-
fication of the goods and as late as delivery of the goods to the
buyer.144
tion of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops
growing or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the land con-
cerned; and
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
140. In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. REP. SzRv. 327 (D. Me. 1968) and In re American
Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
141. A buyer is given the right of an insurable interest in goods when identifica-
tion of the goods has occurred. In the absence of explicit agreement between the
buyer and seller, identification is defined in U.C.C. § 2-501(1) to occur as follows:
(1) The buyer obtains a special property and an insurable interest in goods
by identification of existing goods as goods to which the contract refers even
though the goods so identified are non-conforming and he has an option to
return or reject them. Such identification can be made at any time and in any
manner explicitly agreed to by the parties. In the absence of explicit agreement
identification occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing
and identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other than those described
in paragraph (c), when goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by
the seller as goods to which the contract refers;
(c) when the crops are planted or otherwise become growing crops or the
young are conceived if the contract is for the sale of unborn young to be born
within twelve months after contracting or for the sale of crops to be harvested
within twelve months or the next normal harvest season after contracting
whichever is longer.
142. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a).
143. See Sussen Rubber Co. v. Hertz, 19 Ohio App. 2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 65 (1969)
and In re Samuels & Co., Inc., 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975) rev'd en banc, 526 F.2d
1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
144. Passage of title is defined in U.C.C. § 2-401 as follows:
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights, obligations and
remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irre-
spective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title.
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It should be noted that there is some authority for the pro-
position that the debtor cannot acquire rights in the collateral
until such time as he acquires possession of the collateral. 145
However, there is enough uncertainty on the issue to permit
the floating lien creditor broad latitude for the argument that
the debtor may acquire rights in the collateral earlier than the
date the collateral actually comes within the possession of the
debtor. In the event the collateral is after-acquired equipment
covered by the floating lien, there is a good chance that iden-
tification occurs substantially earlier than the date of posses-
sion by the debtor.1 46 Thus, there is ample opportunity for the
Insofar as situations are not covered by the other provisions of this Article and
matters concerning title beconie material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract for sale prior to their identi-
fication to the contract (section 2-501), and unless otherwise explicitly agreed
the buyer acquires by their identification a special property as limited by this
Act. Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a secur-
ity interest. Subject to these provisions and to the provisions of the Article on
Secured Transactions (Article 9), title to goods passes from the seller to the
buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time
and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the
physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest
and even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or
place; and in particular and despite any reservation of a security interest by
the bill of lading
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the
buyer but does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to
the buyer at the time and place of shipment; but
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender
there.
(3) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where delivery is to be made without
moving the goods,
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of title, title passes at the time
when and the place where he delivers such documents; or
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already identified and no
documents are to be delivered, title passes at the time and place of contracting.
(4) A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or retain the goods,
whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance revests title to
the goods in the seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law and is not a
"sale".
145. The buyer and the seller can contract for the passage of title. See U.C.C. § 2-
401. In In re Bosson, 432 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Conn. 1977) the court construed the date
the debtor acquired rights in the collateral as the date title passed from the seller to
the buyer (debtor) within the meaning of U.C.C. § 2-401(2).
146. In re Page, 6 U.C.C. Ran. SERV. 250 (W.D. Ky. 1968) and General Electric
Credit Corp. v. Tidwell Industries, Inc., 115 Ariz. 362, 565 P.2d 868 (1977) (en banc).
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floating lien creditor to argue that the date of transfer oc-
curred prior to the ninety-day period under the perfection of
transfer test in section 547.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is likely that the four judicial theories which were popu-
lar during the reign of the 1950 amendments to section 60 will
quickly lose their popular appeal under the perfection of
transfer test in subsection 547(e) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. However, the floating lien creditor may find a
source of "security" for an otherwise voidable transfer in the
"acquisition of rights" doctrine embodied in the perfection of
transfer test. The future should hold some interesting judicial
developments under section 547 for the secured creditor with
a floating lien on property of the debtor.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
§ 547. Preferences
(a) In this section-
(1) "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished, held
for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw
materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business,
including farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale or
lease;
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, services,
or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously trans-
ferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voida-
ble by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, but does not
include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation;
(3) "receivable" means right to payment, whether or not such right
has been earned by performance; and
(4) a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last
payable, including any extension, without penalty.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at
the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose ben-
efit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for a
new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of busi-
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ness or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that
was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such security interest
attaches;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such trans-
fer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest;
and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor;
(5) of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such trans-
fers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the
petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of
any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded
the value of all security interest for such debt on the later of-
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of
this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B)
of this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; and
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the secur-
ity agreement creating such security interest; or
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under sec-
tion 545 of this title.
(d) A trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor transferred
to secure reimbursement of a surety that furnished a bond or other obliga-
tion to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the trustee
under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such surety under such
bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of such
property recovered by the trustee or the amount paid to the trustee.
(e)(1) For the purposes of this section-
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including
the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real
property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property
from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to
be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest
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of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is
perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial
lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph
(3) of this subsection, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days
after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is per-
fected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such transfer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the trans-
feror and the transferee.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the
debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition.
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